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ARISING OUT OF-RIGHT OF AGGRESSOR IN ASSALLT
TO RECOVER-ASSAULT AS AN ACCIDENT s
Fight rooted in the work, immaterial that injured man was
the aggressor. Assault was accident from point of view of
victim.
The boss shipper argued with a truck driver over the dilatory manner in which the driver was supposed to have done his
work. The shipper was the first to raise his arm in a striking
position, and was pushed over by the driver. The resultiig fall
was fatal to the boss shipper. Compensation was denied his
widow qn several grounds, mainly that there was no accident and
the deceased was the aggressor.
Held error to deny compensation. From the point of view
of the victim and in a popular sense the death was accidental.
The defense of "aggression" is not found in compensation statutes, and its judicial insertion is error, whether applied to sportive assault (horseplay) or to this type of assault.
Newell v Moreau, 94 N.H. 439, 55 A. 2d 476 (Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, July 2, 1947), per Kenison, J.
Discussion. The subject of "aggressors" in assaults, whether
sportive (horseplay) or malicious (ill-will attacks), is now demanding the serious attention of the Courts.
Sportive assaults (horseplay)
In the early days, when the words "arising out of the employment" were given a narrow and strict interpretation, it was
easy to brush aside such assaults as non-compensable. Some of
the early judges were actually shocked to hear a lawyer argue
in favor of a worker injured as a result of horseplay Thus in
Wisconsin, an air hose was thrust playfully into an imocent
victim's rectum. Said its highest court: "But how injuries resulting from such inexcusable and revolting horseplay as this
can be said to be incidental to the employment we are unable
to understand." (Federal Rubber M~fg. Co. v Havolic, 162 Wis.
341, 156 N.W 143, 144 (1916) )
Most courts fell into line-no compensation for any victim
of horseplay, whether innocent, participant or aggressor. (Cor* This note appeared in November, 1948 issue of NACCA Iaw
Journal. It is printed here by consent.
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onado Beach Co. v Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 682, 158 P 212, (1916)
Pierce v Boyer - Van Kuren Lumber Co., 99 Neb. 321, 156 N.W
509 (1916) Lee's Case, 240 Mass. 473, 476, 134 N.E. 268
(1922) )
And then (in 1920) a judge's judge, Mr. Justice Cardozo
of the Court of Appeals of New York, had occasion to review
a horseplay case. Two boys had thrown apples at each other,
hitting an innocent non-participating victim, and blinding one
of his eyes.
Said that most eminent jurist "English cases hostile to the
are inconsistent, it would seem, in principle with
award
later rulings of the House of Lords (Thorn v Sinclair)
They are certainly inconsistent with the broader conception of
employment and its incidents to which this court is now committed", that the true facts of factory life must be recognized,
that the apple victim "was injured, not merely while he was in
a factory, but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and conditions inseparable from factory life. The risks
of such associations and conditions were risks of the employment", that factories "have crowded contacts" and resulting
injuries "are not measured by the tendency of such acts to serve
the master's business", and that such horseplay arose out of
the employment, as an incident thereof, and that innocent victims must be protected by compensation awards. (Leonbruno v
Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y 470, 128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R.
522 (1920) )
The doctrine that horseplay arises out of the work-environment. and hence arises out of an incident of the employment,
was thus given vitality by a great jurist.
It was this clarion call which appealed to court after court
thereafter. To Mr. Justice Cardozo more than anyone else goes
the great credit for saving at least the innocent victims of horseplay from the charity scrap-heap. Court after court saw 'the
logic of his argument, and ruled as a matter of law, or took
judicial notice of the fact, or said it was a matter of common
knowledge, that factories and work-places have crowded contacts and resulting injuries are not to be measured by the tendency of the act to serve the master's purposes, and that injuries
not arising from the work as such, but from the work-environment, were incidents of the employment. (Chicago I. & L. Ry
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Co. v Clendennin, 81 Ind. App. 323, 143 N.E. 303 (1924)
Cassell v United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 115 Tex.
371,392, 283 S.W 127, 46 A.L.R. 1137 (1926) Maltais v
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 93 N.HE. 237,242, 40 A. 2d
837 (1944) )
And what is even more startling.-- courts which had already placed themselves on record against ever giving any
awards in horseplay or "larkng" cases began to recant' Stare
decmis yielded to the growing pressure of common sense and to
the broadened construction of the words "arising out of" the
employment.
In 1928 Wisconsin openly admitted its error, when an innocent victim sitting on a window sill was hit in the eve by a
nail thrown in horseplay by a fellow employee. It overruled its
Havolic case and granted an award. Horseplay was "inseparable
from the natural bent of the human mind," when people "are
reqired to assemble for work." (Badger Furniture Co. v Industrial Commission, 195 Wis. 134,137,138, 217 N.W 734
(1928) )
In 1921 Nebraska had overruled her earlier cases, and came
out in favor of an innocent victim of a compressed air hose.
(Socha v Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N.W 706
(1921))
In 1945 California had to admit error after 30 years of
denying awards to all victims of horseplay It now saw its
mistake in not helping the innocent victim. (Pacific Employees
I-ns. Co. v Industrial Accident Commission, 26 Cal. 2d 286. 158
P 2d 9 (1945), per Edmonds, J )
And only recently, in 1948, Georgia joined the parade
away from narrow compensation thinking, and stated that any
cases contra to helping the innocent victim are to be considered
overruled. (Felton, J., in American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v
Benford, 47 S.W 2d 673, 676 (Ga. App. April 15, 1948) )
However, while making a new rule for the innocent victim
the courts began to issue dicta against the assailant, against the
initiator of the assault, or as he was generally called, "aggressor." The reason for the dicta against the aggressor was clear.
In trying to make a new rule or exception palatable, it has for
many years been customary for courts to throw a judicial bone
of solace to the losing employer or insurer. The courts, faced by
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the early general rule of non-compensability for assaults. sportive and otherwise, wished to reverse the rule for the innocent
victim. It has been the history of law that when courts wish to
make a change, they proceed cautiously, that they put boundaries
around the change, and thereby issue dicta which give the loser
some hope in future cases, thus making the decision presumably
acceptable to both parties. Decisions in compensation cases are
no different than decisions in other types of cases. Hence arose
the exception to the new rule-that the aggressor could not recover. (See how dicta became law later in Ackerman v Cardillo,
78 App. D. C. 310, 140 F 2d 348 (1944), and Borden Mills. Inc.
v iMeGaha, 161 Tenn. 376, 32 S.W 2d 1039 (1930))
The idea that aggressors cannot recover, as they cannot
"profit by their own wrong" sounded logical. It was a popular
tort phrase. It fitted snugly with the natural repugnance one
has for a guilty party Yet not a single act mentioned the defense of aggressors, not a single act denied compensation to
negligent employees though they profited by their own culpability, but like many other court-created defenses, the theory
began life as an easy way to sustain an award for the innocent
victim and still leave some hope to the employer that he would
not be overwhelmed by assuming liability for all injuries by
assault. The phrase "excluding aggressors" had begun life, and
Justice Frankfurter on a similar court-created
as stated by MNIr.
problem, "its felicity leads to its lazy repetition, and repetition
soon establishes it as a legal formula, indiscriminately used to
express different and sometimes contradictory ideas." (Tiller
v Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444,452
(1943), in discussing "assumption of risk").
It is the horseplay itself that arises out of the employment,
as an incident of the employment-environment. "Whether for
aggressor or innocent victim, it is the same assault which arises
out of employment. And the injury arises out of this assault.
Therefore the injury-whether to aggressor or to innocent victim-arises out of employment. This to us is an unavoidable
syllogism." (Reis, J., in Vollmer v City of Milwaukee, Circuit
Court, Dane County, Wisconsin, May 5, 1948)
No act contains the legislative defense that an "aggressor"
or "participant" is not to recover in horseplay cases. Its insertion is purely judicial, justified by no legislative fiat, and sus-
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tamed only by the judge's feeling that culpable persons should
not benefit by their own wrong-the very defense that all compensation acts reject. Negligence or guilt or assumption of risk
or contribution are forever banned as defenses in compensation
acts. (Stark v State Industrial Accident Commission, 103 Ore.
80, 204 P 151,156-157 (1922) Rutledge J., in Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v Cardillo, 72 App. D. C. 52, 112 F 2nd
11 (1940), certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649, 60 S.Ct. 1100)
At first only Oregon resisted the easy insertion of moral
or common law culpability into workmen's compensation cases.
Since 1922 its courts have insisted that culpability is not a defense and awards have been given to all types of victims of
horseplay (Stark v State Industrial Accident Commission, 103
Ore. 80, 204 P 151 (1922)
In 1944, New Hampslure rejected the defense of participation in horseplay (Maltais v Equitable Life Assurance Society,
93 N. H. 237, 40 A. 2d 837 (1944) )
Finally, in 1948. all federal employees under the U. S.
Employees' Compensation Act were declared protected in horseplay cases, including "aggressors", as horseplay is inseparable
from the working-environment, and as much an incident of employment as slipping on the floor, or other personal incidents,
such as smoking, resting, eating on the premises, etc. (Williams
v Navy Department, Docket No. 68, decided January 6, 1948,
U.S. Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, Federal Security
Agency, Washington. D C. See I NACCA Law Journal, pages
9, 105, 'av 1948)
New York, faced with its own prior decisions denying aggressors any compensation, adopted a curious compromise-if
the horseplay was customary and known to the employer, it
becomes a compensable incident even for the aggressor I (Industrial Comnissioner (Siguin) v MN[cCarthy, 295 N.Y 443, 68
N.E. 2d 434 (1946) where waiters customarily engaged in bilateral horseplay This case was affirmed in principle in Ognibene
v Rochester Mfg. Co., 298 N.Y 85, 80 N.E. 2d 749 (July 16,
1948), per Fuld, J., where a unilateral bit of horseplay (only
one participant) resulted in injury It was recommitted to find
out if these pranks were customary and lmown to the employer.
Desmond, J., dissented "To say that this claimant by this trifling act of foolery stepped completely out of his role of work-
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man and became aggressor in an encounter during which he was
hurt, would be to magnify unfairly what was a most msignificant antic." There the employee hit his face on a truck, while
-ducking to avoid detection, after tossing a small piece of rubber
.at a stenographer)
In short, an aggressor who unilaterally fools for the first
time, unknown to the employer, probably cannot collect in New
York, but if he is a repeater, a customary violator known to the
-employer and engages in bilateral fooling, he is entitled to recover. The moral justification for holding an employer who per
mits horseplay to become a custom is apparent, but it is the
]orseplay which is ncidental to the employment, incidental be,cause men are brought into close contacts and horseplay results.
And to distinguish between the types of victims of these horseplay incidents is to insert culpability into workmen's compenSsation acts m a new garb.
The 1948 New York position is an improvement over its
-old law, and avoids the necessity of "overruling" its old casea hard task for so eminent a court. But it fails to give the full
remedy for "aggressors" such as is now given in Oregon, New
Hampshire, and to federal employees. What other states will do
in sportive assaults in the future remains to be seen. The pathway at least has been well illuminated.
Malicious Assaults
In malicious assaults, it is easier for courts to see the relationship to the employment. An assault is clearly "rooted in"
the work when men fight over the manner of doing the work,
(Hegler v Cannon *MillsCo., 224 N. C. 669, 31 S. E. 2d 918,919
(1944), per Stacy, C.J.), or over the use of tools and facilities in
doing the work, (Schueller v Armour & Co., 116 Pa. Super, 323,
176 A. 527 (1935)-though decedent allegedly struck first), or
because of labor troubles and strikes (Corcoran v Teamsters &
Chauffeurs Joint Council, 209 Mhinn. 289, 297 N. W 4 (1941)
per Gallagher, C. J. Accord Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v
England, 212 S.W 2d 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948), per Coe, C.J )
Equally clear is it that assaults for purely personal reasons,
-even on the premises, where the opportunity for the assault was
not enhanced by working conditions, have no causal relation to
-the employment. (Henderson, J., in Rice v Revere Copper &
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Brass, 48 A. 2d 166 (Md. 1948), and Fishburne, J., in Bridges
v Elite, Inc., 212 S.C. 514, 48 S.E. 2d 497 (1948) )
But one cannot deny that a fight "arises out of the employment" when the employment is a cause of the fight. Hence
it has always been easier to see the causal relation In malicious
assault cases than in cases of horseplay, where the relationship
is only secondary-as an incident of placing men in close contact. It is only the working-environment and not the work itself
which usually causes the horseplay For that reason courts have
found it easier to ignore the defense of aggressor in assault cases
as distinguished from horseplay cases.
From the very start, therefore, a few courts have protested the insertion of the defense of aggressor in direct workquarrels. Most compensation acts have the legislative defense
disallowing compensation where the injury results from the
wilful intention of the employee to injure himself or another.
or where the injiey results from his "serious and wilful misconduct. "
This clearly bars the employee who engages in a premeditated and deliberate assault. But it does not apply to assaults
which are the result of impulsive, thoughtless, or umntentional
acts (even though in anger or with ill-will), often trivial in
origin, although the result may be serious, or even fatal. The
"explosive point is merely the culmination of antecedent pressures" in many instances, and far from the deliberate act needed
for wilful misconduct or wilful injury (Rutledge, J., in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v Cardillo, 72 App. D C. 52,
112 F 2d 11 (1940), certiorari denied, 310 U.S. 649, 60 S. Ct.
1100. See also discussion and cases in Assaults and Horseplay
under Workmen's Compensation Laws, 12 Law Society Journal.
pages 217-221 (August, 1946) )
But this protestation against the insertion of the defense
of aggressor in compensation cases was often only by way of
dictum. (1930 N.C. -- Conrad v Cook-Lewis Foundry Co.. 198
N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266, dictum that only wilful intention to injure is a bar. 1937 Texas .- Traders & General Ins. Co. v Mills,
108 S.W 2d 219,224 (Tex. Civ App. 1937)-"immaterial as to
which one of them was the aggressor" on the facts. 1945 Pa. Haas v. Brotherhood of Transportation Workers, 158 Pa. Super.
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291, 44 A. 2d 776,780-janitor struck first yet received an
award)
And it has remained for the principal case, with Mr. Justice
Kemuson speaking for the New Hampshire Supreme Court, to
face the issue of aggressor in a direct, frontal attack. He was
fortunate in one respect-there were no previous New Hampshire Supreme Court cases contra to bother him. He could view
the case in the light of current thinlng in workmen's compensation. Nevertheless, the highest court in New Hampshire had a
ruling below (against the worker) to overcome. Said Kenison,
J."Compensation was also denied because Newell was an
'aggressor' There is much conflict in the decisions on this point
(112 A.L.R. 1258,1270) but the trend of the modern authority
is to allow recovery In order not to bludgeon the bar into insensibility by copious citations and prolix footnotes we refer to
the discussion and collection of cases in the articles cited in the
first part of the opinion. The defense of 'aggression' is not to be
found in our statute or in other compensation laws. By the application of tort reasoning the defense has been judicially inserted in some compensation cases. We have already refused to
read in a similar defense in sportive assaults (Maltais v Assur
ance Society, 93 N.H. 237) and we see no reason for its judicial
insertion in this assault. In reaching this result we have endeavored to follow the able reasoning of three leading cases in
Workmen's Compensation Law, Cardozo, J., in Leonbruno v
Mills, 229 N. Y 470, Rutledge, J., in Hartford etc. Co. v Car
dillo, 122 F 2d 11, and Marble, C. J. in Maltais v Assurance
Society, supra. Plaintiff is entitled to compensation in accordance with R.L., c. 216. Exceptions sustained."
And he added another sobering thought on the subject.that there is no distinction between aggression in assaults and
aggression in horseplay cases. The principle was the same.
"While it is true that the assault in the Maltais Case (93
N.H. 237) was sportive mu nature, the reasoning of that decision
is not so limited. An assault whether by design or in sport is mu
the course of the employment, where, as here, it was caused by
or resulted from working conditions."
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Assault as an "accident"
He disposed of the insurer's contention that an assault by
-design could not be "by accident" in the following language "It is argued that Newell's death was not 'by accident'
-within the meaning of R.L., c. 216, s. 2. The trend of the recent
,cases regards assaults by design as accidents. From the point of
view of the victim and in a popular sense, (Moore v. Company,
88 N.H. 134,138) Newell's death was sudden, unexpected and
truly accidental. The majority of the cases, particularly those decided in the last three years, support this view Horovitz, 'Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensation', 21 Ind. L. J. 473, 491493 (1946), Duncan v Perry Packing Co., (Kan. 1946), 174 P
(2d) 78, Hagger v Wortz Biscuit Co., (Ark. 1946), 196 S.W
(2d) 1, Kaiser v Reardon Co., (Mo. 1946), 195 S.W (2d) 477,
Echols v Company (Ga. App. 1946), 38 S.E. (2d) 675,678."
Clearly, from the point of view of the victim, the mjurv is
unexpected and accidental in nature.
Indeed, the overwhelming weight of modern authority so
holds both in the United States and in England. (Anderson v
Hotel Cataract, 70 S.D 376, 17 N.W 2d 913 (1945) Daughertv
v City of Monnett, 238 Mo. App. 924, 192 S.W 2d 51 (1946)
'Smith v. Stepney Corporation (1929), 22 B.W.C.C. 451, W.C.
-and Ins. Rep. 349)
Awards to aggressors
Even before the instant case many courts made awards to
;aggressors-but did it not by facing the legal issue, but by
ignoring or overlooking the fact of aggression. (Chanm v Western Union Telegraph Co., 271 App. Div 763, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 670
(1946), Geltman v Reliable Linen & Supply Co., 128 N.J.L.
443, 25 A. 2d 894,897 (1942) So. Pac. Co. v Sheppeard, 29 F
:Supp. 376 (1939)-a typical longshore brawl, "inseparable
irom a longshoreman's life", per Kennerlv, District Judge, affirmed in 112 F 2d 147 (5 Cir. 1940), per McCord, Circuit
Judge. Shultz v Chevrolet Motor Co., 256 Mich. 393, 239 N.W
'894 (1932) )_
Other courts, wishing to make an award, engaged in metaphysics -and hairline distinctions in attempting to prove that the
injured man, although a participant, was m fact not the aggressor.If he swore first, and the other fellow punched first, he
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won because he was not the aggressor in the fisticuffs. (York
v City of Hazard, 191 S.W 2d 239,241 (Ky 1945), Fey v
Bobrink, 84 Ind. App. 559, 151 N.E. 705,706 (1926), Rydeen v.
'Monarch Furniture Co., 240 N.Y 295, 148 N.E. 527 (1925), per
Crane, J., (Cardozo, J., concurring), reversing 212 A. D. 843,
207 N.Y.S. 911 (1925) ) If he struck first then the other fellow
by using vile language or being overly-playful caused the fight
and was the aggressorI (Haas v Brotherhood of Transportation
Workers, 158 Pa. Super. 291, 44 A. 2d 776 (1945), Verschleiser.
v Stern & Son, 229 N.Y 192, 128 N.E. 126 (1920) ) Or, if he
really punched or threw first, the punch or missile did no harm
-it was the other fellow's punch or missile which did the damageI (Stulginski v Waterbury Rolling Mills Co., 124 Conn. 355,
199 A. 653,657,658 (1938)-aggression not necessarily fatal, per
Maltbie, C. J Chicago R. I. & P Ry Co. v Ind. Comm., 288 Ill.
126, 123 N.E. 278 (1919), certiorari denied, 250 U.S. 670, 40
S. Ct. 15 (1919) )
And when recently Judge Reis of the Circuit Court of
Dane County, Wisconsin, said the evidence showed the injure&
party was the aggressor, but that aggressors in work-made
fights are entitled to recover, the lughest court of Wisconsin
avoided passing on the issue, by stating that the industrial commission found as a fact that the injured party was not the aggressor, so no ruling of law on aggressors was necessary (North
End Foundry Co. v Staub, 251 Wis. 332,334, 29 N.W 2d 40'
(1948) )
But the question of aggression will continue to rear its
head and has already rolled over into the field of admiralty
When that occurred in 1948. the very able United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit referred to the instant
New Hampshire case as "the persuasive decision, allowing compensation to the aggressor." Said Clark, Circuit Judge, in Kable
v. United States, 169 F 2d 90, 93-94 (2 Cir. July 31, 1948),
after stating that the admiralty right of maintenance and cure
is a broader liability than imposed by modern worknen s compensation acts:-'-"Yet under those acts recovery is increasingly
allowed for injuries sustained as a result of fighting without
making too fine a point as to who was the aggressor. See the
leading case, also by Justice Rutledge before going to the Supreme Court, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v Cardillo,
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72 App. D.C. 52, 112 F 2d 11. certiorari demed 310 U.S. 649.
60 S. Ct. 1100, or the persuasive decision in Newell v Moreau.
94 N.H. 439, 55 A. 2d 476, allowing compensation to the aggressor, also cases such as Chanin v Western Umon Telegraph Co.,
271 App. Div 763, 64 N.Y.S. 2d 670, Corbett v Biewener, 270
App. Div 782, 59 N.Y.S. 2d 359, and the comprehensive discussion in Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay under Worhnen's
Compensation Laws, 41 Ill. L. Rev 311."
New Hampshire has met the challenge, with commendable
courage, of its convictions. It remains for other great courts to
think the matter through without the fetters of outmoded,
ancient thinking, and to give the aggressor, short of one guilty
of intentional or wilful misconduct, the right to workmen's
compensation when the injury arises from an assault rooted in
the employment and not in a purely personal matter.

